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I.  TRANSFORMATIONAL PRESIDENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
We have several ways of thinking about the Supreme Court and 
constitutional change.  One method, exemplified often in “end of 
the Term” commentary, takes the cases as they come to the Court, 
uses rough categories such as “liberal” and “conservative” or “pro-
business” and “pro-consumer” to describe the outcomes, and at-
tempts to identify some trends in doctrine and outcomes.  This me-
thod focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme Court in isolation 
from the rest of the government, except in occasional references to 
the possibility that a new Justice might affect the outcomes in some of 
the cases discussed.  This method can generate fine-grained insights 
into the Court’s quotidian work, but often misses the Court’s role in 
the overall—and changing—system of government. 
Another method develops models and tests them using aggregate 
data.1
 
 * William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
  Some models focus exclusively on the Court, worrying about 
the extent to which Justices decide with reference to “the law” or with 
reference to something else, usually described as personal values and 
preferences.  Other models consider the Court’s interaction with the 
President and Congress, treating the Justices as strategic actors seek-
ing to achieve the most of whatever it is they happen to value.  Like 
all models, those in both these types strip away a fair amount of detail 
and often seem unrealistic to observers who worry that too much 
nuance has been lost.  And, sometimes the available data for aggrega-
tion match the models’ variables only imperfectly, thereby reducing 
the depth of insight one can get from them. 
 1 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 10–14 (1997) (providing a good in-
troduction to the range of studies fitting within the approach sketched in this para-
graph). 
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This Article sketches a third approach, associated with a field 
known as “American political development” and applies it—
hypothetically—to explore some possibilities for constitutional devel-
opment during a hypothesized second term for President Obama.  
This approach begins with the premise that constitutional develop-
ment occurs as circumstances and structures interact.  To elaborate:  
By “constitutional development” I mean changes in the large-scale ar-
rangements through which political power is exercised,2 and by 
“structures” I mean reasonably persistent patterns of interaction 
among political actors, organized by reasonably persistent (but not 
immutable) explicit or implicit rules for deploying political power.  
So, for example, the rise of political parties is an example of political 
development in the Early Republic; the domination of our political 
system by two parties is an example of how rules—in this instance, the 
first-past-the-post system of awarding political office to the person 
who receives more votes than any other candidate, within geographi-
cally defined districts that elect a single representative—create struc-
tures; whether a Supreme Court vacancy occurs early or late in a Pres-
ident’s term combines a circumstance—the timing of a death, 
resignation, or retirement—with a structural feature.3
This Article speculates about some possible constitutional devel-
opments in an again hypothetical second Obama term.  It draws on 
ideas developed by political scientist Stephen Skowronek.
 
4
“Chronological time” is the simple ticking of the clock, but taken 
in relation to the timing of presidential and congressional elections.  
Because of this relation, I refer in this Article to institutional rather 
than chronological time.  For Congress and the Presidency, chrono-
logical and institutional time are almost identical because the Consti-
tution—one of our structural rules—requires that elections occur at 
  Skowro-
nek distinguishes between chronological time and political time. 
 
 2 My concern is with constitutional development, not doctrinal development, and the Su-
preme Court comes into my sights only when its role in organizing and distributing polit-
ical power becomes relevant to the argument. 
 3 For present purposes I simply assume, as the empirical evidence weakly suggests, that Jus-
tices do not time their departures strategically.  For one study, see Christopher J. W. Zorn 
& Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789–1992, 22 
POL. BEHAV. 145, 145 (2000) (concluding that “[J]ustices who retire do not generally do 
so for expressly political reasons”).  But see Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements:  A Polit-
ical Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25, 25 (1993) (find-
ing “an identifiable political element relating to the timing of retirements from the 
Court”). 
 4 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:  LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1993). 
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fixed chronological intervals.5  But, chronological and institutional 
time differ for the Supreme Court, because of the irregularity and 
unpredictability with which Justices replace each other.  That irregu-
larity interacts with the complex relation between institutional time 
for the President with a four-year term potentially renewable once 
and the Senate with one-third elected every two years.  Because the 
President’s institutional time differs from the Senate’s, the nomi-
nation and confirmation process can change within a single Presi-
dent’s term, and the characteristics of that process will affect the re-
placement of one Justice by another in unpredictable ways.6
“Political time,” for Skowronek, refers to the relation between a 
President and his or her predecessors and successors.  Skowronek 
identifies several presidential types, defined with reference to politi-
cal time.  For my purposes, only one is of interest.  Some Presidents, 
Skowronek argues, are “transformative” or “reconstructive.”
 
7  Such 
Presidents see themselves as repudiating the general policy paths 
marked out by their immediate predecessors and setting out on quite 
different paths.  In addition, they devise new institutions of govern-
ment, or alter existing ones, to generate and sustain new constituen-
cies that will enduringly support the President, at least in part because 
of the new policies the President has put in place.8
For present purposes I treat President Obama as a potentially re-
constructive or transformational President.  That he positioned him-
self against an exhausted set of policies associated with a series of 
Presidents seems uncontroversial.  That he aspired to a large-scale 
  Transformation is 
of course not instantaneous, but emerges—if it does—as the Presi-
dent’s policies are implemented, new or modified institutions begin 
operating, and new constituencies of political support develop. 
 
 5 The difference between chronological and institutional time with respect to elections can 
be seen in parliamentary systems, which generally allow the executive head of govern-
ment to decide when, within some fixed time span, to call an election. 
 6 For example, on the assumption animating this Article, that President Obama is ree-
lected, whether a Supreme Court vacancy will occur during his second term is entirely 
contingent, but whether he will have to get a replacement Justice confirmed by a Senate 
with a Republican or a Democratic majority is the product of the difference between in-
stitutional time for the President and the Senate. (I deal with issues arising from the pos-
sibility of a minority party filibuster below, see infra text accompanying note 17.) 
 7 SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 36–42. 
 8 Importantly, reconstructive Presidents may see themselves in this way, but they need not 
present themselves as such in their initial campaigns.  Usually all they must do is say that 
they are true alternatives to a prior presidency or series of presidencies whose policies can 
be presented as having been exhausted.  A classic example is Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(“FDR”), whose 1932 campaign included strong commitments to balancing the budget, 
abandoned shortly after FDR took office. 
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shift in policy direction is of course more controversial, for several 
reasons.  Dramatic shifts in policy direction have not (yet) occurred.  
In addition, some elements of shifts Obama offered as a candidate 
appear to have been abandoned (for now), with climate change legis-
lation being the primary example.  And, the President’s major policy 
initiative, one healthcare provision, ended up rejecting structures like 
a single-payer system or payment of all medical costs by the govern-
ment that would have been dramatic changes, in favor of a complex 
structure that accepted much of the core of private control of health-
care insurance. 
Even with these cautions, I think it interesting to think of Presi-
dent Obama as reconstructive or transformational.  Shift attention 
from policies to structures, and we can see some features associated 
with transformational presidencies.  For example, as a candidate Ob-
ama creatively exploited the new social media far more effectively 
than anyone had previously done.9  He generated a large amount of 
financial support from what (adapting a term from Professor Richard 
Hasen) I call “microfinancing,” a steady flow of small-scale but often 
repeated contributions.10  He also organized the so-called “ground 
game”—the techniques of person-to-person appeals and get-out-the-
vote efforts that political scientists have shown to be enormously ef-
fective11—through the new social media.12
A second example is the political effect of the Affordable Care 
Act.  Even though the Act is under a constitutional cloud as I write in 
April 2012, some of its components have already been implemented, 
and the beneficiaries—families with children under the age of twenty-
six covered by their parents’ health insurance, and those with prior 
medical conditions that previously would have disqualified them from 
obtaining health insurance—can be counted as likely supporters of 
President Obama in the next election and of the Democratic Party 
thereafter.
 
13
 
 9  David Carr, How Obama Tapped into Social Networks’ Power, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008.  
  If fully implemented in 2014, the Affordable Care Act 
 10 See Rick Hasen, Senator Obama and the Decision to Opt Out of Public Financing, ELECTION L. 
BLOG (May 27, 2008, 11:44 am), http://electionlawblog.org/archive.0s/010905.html (re-
ferring to “micro-donors”). 
 11 See Donald P. Green & Alan S. Gerber, Get Out the Vote:  How to Increase Voter Turnout 
(2004) (summarizing the research findings). 
 12 See Robert Paul Wolff, The Ground Game, THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE, (Dec. 7, 2011, 3:59 
am), http://robertpaulwolff.blogspot.com/2011/12/ground-game.html (describing the 
Obama ground game in 2008). 
 13 Some qualifications:  The Great Recession’s continuing economic effects may weaken this 
effect, as does the possibility that the Supreme Court would find the Affordable Care 
Act’s core individual-mandate provision unconstitutional and inseverable from the re-
mainder of the statute, including the provisions already in effect. 
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might have political effects similar to that of the Social Security sys-
tem, tying a large group of beneficiaries (and voters) to the party re-
sponsible for its enactment.14
II.  STRUCTURES OF RESISTANCE TO TRANSFORMATIONAL OR 
RECONSTRUCTIVE PRESIDENTS 
  Perhaps the Democratic Party should 
embrace the term “Obamacare,” devised by Republicans as a deroga-
tory term—at least if the Affordable Care Act is fully implemented. 
Continuing with the assumption that President Obama is a trans-
formational or reconstructive President, we must consider the next 
steps in Skowronek’s argument.  Transformational Presidents inevit-
ably face opposition.  They may have defeated the old order in a sin-
gle election, but differences in institutional time mean that politi-
cians supporting that order remain in office, with some—sometimes 
significant—political resources.  Transformational Presidents hope to 
overcome that opposition as time passes and institutional time is dis-
placed by political time. 
But, Skowronek argues, that hope becomes increasingly difficult 
to realize because of what he calls “institutional thickening.”15
I have already alluded to one example of institutional thicken-
ing—the political support generated by the adoption of Social Securi-
ty and Medicare.  Today politicians who believe it important to con-
front what they regard as the serious fiscal consequences of those 
programs understand that the programs’ current beneficiaries 
strongly support the programs in their current form and would pu-
nish any politician who threatened to alter them substantially.  Politi-
cians respond by developing reform programs that insulate current 
  Institu-
tional thickening describes the institutional and structural legacy of 
the old order.  Transformational Presidents are followed by others 
who consolidate that President’s innovations, or accept them as part 
of the environment within which the successor Presidents must work.  
The transformational or reconstructive President’s institutional inno-
vations remain in place, and provide continuing support for that 
President’s programs—even after the transformational presidency 
and its successors have exhausted the possibilities presented by their 
innovations. 
 
 14 Here the major qualification is that the Affordable Care Act might have long-term fiscal 
implications that would be politically problematic.  But, those implications might be irre-
levant to a politician with a time-horizon of one or two decades.  And, I suspect, all Presi-
dents have such a time horizon. 
 15 SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 56. 
1108 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
beneficiaries from changes, even though doing so can significantly 
reduce the fiscal benefits the reforms hold out. 
The example of Social Security suggests another, broader exam-
ple of institutional thickening.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (“FDR”) pres-
idency, and those of his successors, such as John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson, created a politics of interest groups, theorized by 
some as political pluralism and by others as public choice theory.  
The interest groups benefited from and provided support for a wide 
range of policies and institutions associated with the New Deal and 
the Great Society.  They also contributed to the rise of what political 
scientists call the “iron triangle”16
As chronological time passes, then, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult for a transformational or reconstructive President to succeed in 
his or her ambitions.  I offer some examples of how institutional 
thickening manifested itself during the Obama presidency. 
 of policy-making, the legs of which 
are the interest groups, the relevant executive bureaucracies, and the 
relevant congressional committees.  Notably, the executive at the 
highest level—the President—is not part of the iron triangle.  A re-
constructive President can break some of the iron triangles in place 
when he or she takes office.  But, obviously, doing so takes more po-
litical effort than would be required if the triangles did not exist or 
were made of paper rather than iron.  The iron triangles of the late 
twentieth century were part of the institutional thickening to which 
Skowronek refers. 
The first is constitutional hardball, which I have defined as the de-
velopment of practices that violate previously well-understood and 
accepted ways in which members of political parties who disagreed on 
matters of policy conducted their debates—and fights—over policy 
development.17
 
 16 See B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS:  THE ROLE OF 
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 18 (1994). 
  Putting aside assertions about a decline in civility 
within Congress, which may not rest on accurate descriptions of past 
practices, we can see constitutional hardball in the state of play in 
connection with presidential nominations.  Republicans played con-
stitutional hardball in filibustering nominations to fill positions at the 
 17 Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004).  Note that the 
publication date precedes the Obama presidency.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Verme-
ule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 991 (2008), for related discussions 
referring to “showdowns” or constitutional disagreements between branches of govern-
ment often ending in litigation or settlement that establish a non-judicial precedent; see 
also Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (2009) 
(describing the use of the word “crisis” as a political tool to gain power or sway with the 
American public). 
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National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau; such positions had to be filled for those agencies to have 
the authority to make legally binding decisions.  President Obama 
replied with his own hardball, an aggressive interpretation of the con-
stitutional provision authorizing him to make appointments during 
congressional recesses.18
A feature of constitutional hardball is that each side contends that 
the other breached the relevant implicit understandings first.
 
19  The 
prior breach then is said to have destroyed the implicit understand-
ings already, thereby taking the sting out of the charge that one is 
breaching taken-for-granted norms.  This feature of constitutional 
hardball feeds into another form of institutional thickening, the 
dramatic ideological polarization of the political parties over the past 
decade.  Political scientists measure this polarization in various ways, 
and offer diverse accounts of its origins and depth, but there appears 
to be general agreement that the polarization in Congress is wider 
than it has been in many decades, and perhaps in a century or 
more.20
Perhaps ideological polarization in itself is not a structural feature 
of our government, as I have defined structures earlier.  To make it 
structural, one would need an argument supporting the proposition 
that polarization has become substantially self-reinforcing, so that 
once in place it is difficult to reduce.  I have suggested that constitu-
tional hardball’s characteristic of generating “you did it first” disputes 
might contribute to this self-reinforcement, but I am reasonably con-
fident that there are other and more important contributors.  The 
next paragraphs only sketch some possibilities that I think deserve 
exploration along with others. 
 
One candidate for providing structural support for polarization is 
the overall system of campaign finance.  The overall system includes 
both the microfinancing I have mentioned and large-scale expendi-
tures by nominally independent groups.  Microfinancing contributes 
to polarization because of the widely observed phenomenon of the 
“bubble,” or, put less metaphorically, the tendency of people to use 
social media to interact with and learn from others who already share 
 
 18 For the Obama administration’s official legal defense of its interpretation, see Lawfulness 
of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro 
Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012). 
 19 I note that I did not understand this as a feature of constitutional hardball when I devel-
oped the concept. 
 20 See An Update on Political Polarization (through 2011), VOTEVIEW BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://voteview.com/blog/?p=284 (concluding that “Congress is now more polarized 
than at any time since the late [nineteen]th century”). 
1110 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
their own views.  The bubble, it is generally believed, contributes to 
polarization by amplifying and making more extreme the views 
people hold when they enter the bubble.21
Large-scale independent expenditures affect polarization as well.  
Such expenditures allow candidates to run a two-track campaign.  
The candidate’s own expenditures support high-minded appeals to 
the public interest, while the independent expenditures allow attacks 
on the candidate’s opponents.
  Microfinancing occurs 
within the bubble, and small contributors are then flooded with 
communications from those to whom they have given money and, 
importantly, by others of a similar political persuasion. 
22  Attacks motivate supporters more 
effectively than positive ads,23
Notably, the campaign finance system has been shaped at least in 
part by the Supreme Court, and in particular by the Court’s insis-
tence—correct, in my view—that truly independent expenditures re-
ceive serious First Amendment protection.
 but when they emanate from indepen-
dent groups, the positive effect on turning out supporters comes 
without a backlash against the candidate. 
24
 
 21 The standard citation in the legal literature on this is CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 
(2001); see also Eric Lawrence, John Sides & Henry Farrell, Self-Segregation or Deliberation? 
Blog Readership, Participation, and Polarization in American Politics, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 141, 141 
(2010) (concluding that “blog readers gravitate toward blogs that accord with their politi-
cal beliefs,” that “those who read left-wing blogs and those who read right-wing blogs are 
ideologically far apart,” and that “blog readers are more polarized than either non-blog-
readers or consumers of various television news programs, and roughly as polarized as 
U[nited] S[tates] senators”). 
  And, this fact brings into 
view another source of opposition to a transformational President’s 
efforts—institutional time as well as institutional thickening. 
 22 This argument is predicated on what I believe is coming to be the conventional wisdom, 
that independent expenditures are only nominally independent of the candidate’s own 
campaign.  Journalists have emphasized, for example, how major independent-
expenditures organizations are staffed by people formerly closely associated with an indi-
vidual candidate or his or her campaign. 
 23 On the effects of attack ads, see JOHN G. GEER, IN DEFENSE OF NEGATIVITY:  ATTACK ADS IN 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 142 (2006) (“[N]egativity could ‘augment turnout by arousing 
the voter’s enthusiasm for his or her preferred candidates or by increasing the degree to 
which the voter cares about the outcome of the election.’” (quoting Steven E. Finkel & 
John G. Geer, A Spot Check:  Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising, 42 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 573, 577 (1998))). 
 24 In brief:  The First Amendment should be interpreted to allow people to hire others to 
get the views they hold across more effectively than they themselves can, which is simply a 
description of independent expenditures.  And, the mere fact that a person makes a 
judgment that the most effective way of assisting a favored candidate’s campaign is to 
track or supplement what the candidate’s campaign is itself saying should not be proble-
matic.  The difficulty, of course, is that no one thinks that a large portion of nominally 
independent expenditures are really independent. 
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Structurally, and because of institutional time, early in a transfor-
mational President’s term, the Supreme Court is almost guaranteed 
to be skeptical about the President’s initiatives, and to be receptive to 
plausible constitutional challenges to those initiatives.  Most of the 
Justices in place when the reconstructive or transformational Presi-
dent arrives will have been appointed by Presidents whose policies 
the new President repudiates and seeks to change.  By and large they 
will have been chosen because of their “soundness”—or because they 
have “mainstream” views—which is to say, because they think about 
the Constitution in ways congenial to the appointing President’s gen-
eral orientation.  And finally, over the preceding years these Justices 
will have developed a set of doctrines that will provide substantial le-
gal resources for credible legal arguments against the transforma-
tional President’s initiatives.25
A reconstructive or transformational President is likely to face re-
sistance from the Supreme Court, at least in connection with pro-
grams that can be brought under constitutional scrutiny.  And here 
too a form of institutional thickening might matter.  Over the past 
century the grounds for constitutional objection have expanded and 
the occasions on which the courts are precluded from addressing 
constitutional questions on the merits have been reduced.  For ex-
ample, the Affordable Care Act’s individual-mandate provision will 
become legally binding (if the statute survives constitutional chal-
lenge) only in 2014, but the idea that the courts should abstain from 
addressing the constitutional challenges in cases brought in 2011 
quickly fell by the wayside.
 
26  Put in general terms:  A reconstructive 
or transformational President will advance many new programs; many 
of those initiatives will be subject to credible constitutional challenges 
predicated on the doctrinal structure developed by the Supreme 
Court over the preceding decades; and, many of those challenges will 
in fact be presented to the Supreme Court.27
 
 25 We might think of this as the way in which institutional thickening takes place within the 
Supreme Court.  The thickening is lessened by the possibilities of doctrinal change and 
distinguishing or overruling adverse precedents. 
 
 26 Another form of institutional thickening may matter as well—the development of what 
political scientist Charles Epp calls a “support structure” for constitutional litigation.  For 
Epp’s exposition, see CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).  On the extension of that support 
structure from the liberal to the conservative side, see STEPHEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF 
THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:  THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF THE LAW 
(2008). 
 27 Nothing in the argument I have made rests on the idea that the Justices in place are 
merely doing the bidding of the Presidents who appointed them, or of that President’s 
party.  The argument is that they sincerely hold a way of thinking about the Constitution 
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III.  CONFRONTATION AS THE RESULT OF ATTEMPTED 
TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE 
This Article’s title suggests one possible outcome of attempted 
transformation and resistance resulting from institutional time—
constitutional crisis.  The constitutional confrontation of 1937 had 
the features I have described:  FDR, a reconstructive or transforma-
tional President, pursuing novel policy initiatives, a Supreme Court 
shaped by repeated appointments designed to entrench a constitu-
tional vision inconsistent with FDR’s, constitutional doctrines—
especially the distinction between actions with direct and indirect ef-
fects—available for use to obstruct FDR’s initiatives.  I need not re-
hearse the familiar details of FDR’s effort to rein in the Court 
through expanding its membership, nor the manner of the confron-
tation’s resolution through repeated electoral successes, which gave 
him the opportunity to appoint enough new Justices to change the 
Court. 
The similarity between FDR’s political environment and Ob-
ama’s—a potentially transformative President confronting resistant 
elements of a prior constitutional order—suggests the possibility of a 
similar outcome, that is, another constitutional crisis.  The Roberts 
Court might invalidate the Affordable Care Act, or it might take the 
side of congressional Republicans in some important plays of hard-
ball, such as the President’s recent recess appointments.  One can 
imagine President Obama in his second term finding himself 
shackled by the Court’s decisions and seeking to devise ways of effec-
tively defying the Court.  Yet, there are enough differences between 
FDR’s situation and Obama’s to justify the question mark in the Ar-
ticle’s title. 
Right on the surface, the tools a President has to confront the 
Court are quite limited.  The failure of FDR’s Court-packing plan has, 
in my judgment, created or perhaps confirmed a constitutional con-
vention that the Court’s size cannot be altered merely to achieve po-
litical goals.28
 
compatible with what were regarded as sound or mainstream views when they were ap-
pointed, and that they were appointed because they held those views. 
  No other tools seem readily available, although one can 
 28 I put the convention in these terms because prior changes in the Court’s size sometimes 
occurred in settings where the political implications of doing so were clear, and some-
times where political considerations motivated the changes, but the changes were accom-
panied with plausible “good government” reasons for the changes.  (Indeed, FDR dressed 
up his proposal in “good government” terms, presenting the Court-packing plan as a me-
thod of addressing purported difficulties the nine-member Court had in handling its ca-
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imagine a President reviving a rhetoric of popular constitutionalism 
as a way of reshaping public views about the Court, or selecting new 
nominees for vacancies as they occur on the basis of their acceptance 
of some version of popular constitutionalism.29
Looking to the deeper level identified by the idea of constitution-
al development, we can see some important structural features that 
reduce the possibility of confrontation and crisis.  First, institutional 
thickening means that even continued electoral success does not 
imply policy success.  The polarization that produces thickening in 
some areas has several effects.  Constitutional hardball has changed 
the taken-for-granted rules about filibusters, for example.  Perhaps 
Senate Democrats would change the filibuster rules, but the Senate’s 
rules contain enough provisions that provide opportunities for ob-
structionism and delay that filibuster reform is unlikely to reduce this 
aspect of institutional thickening.
 
30
Relatedly, many of the New Deal’s policy initiatives, such as estab-
lishing a national minimum wage, had deeper support in the public 
than at least some provisions in the Affordable Care Act.  That meant 
that FDR could reasonably expect substantial public support for some 
sort of response to the Supreme Court.
  Party structures were different 
during the New Deal than they are now.  Then political parties were 
clearly coalitions among ideologically disparate groups.  There were 
conservative and liberal Republicans, and conservative and liberal 
Democrats.  That gave FDR and his congressional allies some room 
for political maneuver.  Political polarization has eliminated that 
room for maneuver. 
31
Turning from the possibilities open to the President to those 
available to the Supreme Court:  Institutional thickening means that 
  It seems to me unlikely that 
President Obama could have a similar expectation.  So, taking all 
these matters into account and anticipating that institutional thicken-
ing will make constitutional confrontation with the Supreme Court 
futile, President Obama might forgo the opportunity for that kind of 
confrontation. 
 
seload.)  See JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY:  LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012).  
 29 For myself, I doubt that President Obama would be inclined to take even these modest 
steps. 
 30 For my brief prior comments on this question, see Mark Tushnet, Legal Reasoning in Con-
gress, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 81, 85–87 (2010). 
 31 Barry Cushman pressed this point on me, presenting it as a circumstantial fact about the 
late 1930s.  I have tried to link the differences in public support for presidential initiatives 
to structural features, but perhaps my argument is forced, and the public opinion con-
straint is simply circumstantial and not structural. 
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there is no need for a Court embodying the values of a displaced con-
stitutional order to confront the President, because it can rely on the 
institutional residue of that order elsewhere to take on the President.  
In 1937 Republicans who opposed FDR had few political resources to 
deploy.  The President’s party had massive majorities in both houses 
of Congress, and even taking the coalitional nature of the parties in 
the 1930s into account, FDR’s opponents could do little to obstruct 
his initiatives, especially given the popularity of many of those initia-
tives.32
Of course those same conditions raise other possibilities.  A Presi-
dent finding it impossible to move his initiatives through Congress 
might turn to what Elena Kagan called “presidential administra-
tion.”
  The Supreme Court was the only institutional location in 
which the older order retained enough power to accomplish any-
thing.  The situation today is quite different.  Political polarization, 
the new understandings about filibustering, and the relative narrow-
ness of the margins of support for the President (and, at least in 
2011–2013, Republican control of the House of Representatives) 
make it possible for the President’s opponents to block his initiatives. 
33  Presidential administration is a structural development that 
responds to institutional thickening, specifically to the political pola-
rization that makes it difficult for Congress to enact presidential initi-
atives.  It involves Presidents using their executive powers—whether 
inherent or broadly delegated to them by Congress—to advance their 
distinctive initiatives.34
But, presidential administration could be only another feature of 
the way in which institutional thickening might produce constitu-
tional crisis.  The President will claim that presidential administration 
  Presidential administration makes the Presi-
dent the “first mover” in policy implementation, and the polarization 
that makes presidential administration attractive to Presidents means 
that Congress will be unable to counter his “first moves.” 
 
 32 After the 1936 elections there were seventy-five Democrats in the Senate, seventeen Re-
publicans, and four others; 333 Democrats in the House, eighty-nine Republicans, and 
thirteen others.  See Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855–2013, INFOPLEASE.COM, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (setting forth 
the breakdown of the composition of Congress by political party from 1855 through the 
present). 
 33 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001). 
 34 See id. at 2282–84 (noting examples of presidential administration during the years of 
Clinton’s presidency, such as initiatives on smoking and parental leave in which President 
Clinton strongly associated the White House with yet-to-be-adopted administrative regula-
tions).  In 2012 President Obama announced his intention to use executive power to im-
plement as much of his jobs program as could be done without new legislation.  This is as 
clear an example of presidential administration as can be imagined, and came in re-
sponse to partisan polarization. 
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is lawful, but such claims might be controversial.  Take presidential 
administration in the form of exercising assertedly delegated power.  
The President’s opponents will almost certainly contend that the 
prior delegations do not in fact authorize the steps the President has 
taken, particularly when the President takes those steps because he 
was unable to obtain express contemporaneous congressional autho-
rization for them.  As I noted in connection with President Obama’s 
aggressive use of the recess appointment power, his opponents might 
go to court to challenge presidential administration.35
If that occurs, a confrontation that is at its core between the Presi-
dent and his opponents in Congress could become a confrontation 
between the President and the Supreme Court.  And, again, there 
might be little the President could do in response.  Put overly crude-
ly:  The very fact that the President’s opponents in Congress can im-
pede his initiatives means that they would be able to block any action 
he might hope to take against the Supreme Court. 
  And, the 
courts might agree with his opponents. 
That leaves the mechanism that FDR actually used to bring the 
Court into the New Deal—the power to appoint new Justices.  And 
here, a development on the border between circumstance and struc-
ture comes into play.  Advances in medicine mean that people in 
general have longer life expectancies than in the past.  Presidents 
have understood the implications for life-tenured appointments:  
Appoint relatively young judges.  Doing so will make it more difficult 
for future Presidents to use FDR’s mechanism.36
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this Article I have sketched a way of thinking about the Su-
preme Court and the other branches of our government.  Readers 
may well be skeptical about many of my specific assertions.  Most ob-
viously, I know from conversations in which I have offered similar 
 
 35 I think that the idea of presidential administration can be extended to cover exercises, 
particularly aggressive ones, of the recess appointment power, but I do not think that any-
thing turns on whether those exercises are described as examples of presidential adminis-
tration. 
 36 An anecdotal indication of the phenomenon:  Justice John Paul Stevens retired at age 90.  
On January 21, 2017, the day after a hypothetically reelected President Obama leaves of-
fice, Justice Antonin Scalia—the oldest of the Justices on the Court in 2012 who were ap-
pointed by Republican Presidents—and Justice Anthony Kennedy, the next oldest, will be 
in their early 80s.  Of course both men might leave the Court between 2013 and 2017, but 
the anecdotal point is that increasing life expectancy might mean that a Democratic Pres-
ident elected in 2012 might not have the opportunity to use the mechanism available to 
FDR. 
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sketches that many readers will be skeptical about the assertion that 
President Obama is, or seeks to be, a reconstructive or transforma-
tional President.  But, there are other assertions that might be met 
with skepticism—about whether institutional thickening has oc-
curred, or what the characteristics of institutional thickening are, or 
what the implications of institutional thickening might be. 
As a scholar I am not deeply invested in any of these assertions, 
and so am not bothered by skepticism of the sort I have described.  As 
a scholar I do want to suggest that thinking about the Supreme Court 
and constitutional development in the manner I have sketched here 
is likely to be productive.37
 
 37 So, for example, I would be happy to see someone develop an argument about the possi-
ble course of constitutional development were President Obama to be what Skowronek 
calls a “preemptive” President.  Such Presidents operate within the assumptions of a polit-
ical regime created by a reconstructive or transformative President of the other major 
party (Dwight Eisenhower vis-à-vis Franklin Roosevelt, Bill Clinton vis-à-vis Ronald Rea-
gan, for example—and, perhaps, Barack Obama vis-à-vis Reagan as well).  I would be in-
terested as well in seeing an argument about a hypothesized President Romney, who 
would be what Skowronek calls a President engaged in a politics of “articulation” or a 
“disjunctive” President.  Both types are fully committed to a predecessor’s reconstructive 
efforts, and both seek to make a name for themselves by extending the predecessor’s ef-
forts.  They differ in that the latter take office when many of the predecessor’s initiatives 
have taken root and have to some degree generated their own difficulties—when the ex-
isting system is, in Skowronek’s terms, “vulnerable” rather than “resilient.”  For Skowro-
nek’s description of these other categories, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 39–45. 
 
